asset development for the poor (Sherraden and Gilbert, 1991; Sherraden 1997; Shapiro and Wolff, 2001) , developmental social policy (Midgley 2001 (Midgley , 2003 (Midgley , 2008 or human capital solidarity (Aspalter, 2010) , opened up new horizons in social policy thinking and implementation. Formerly tested and proven approaches are either put aside, modified or supplemented to ensure the abitlity to cope with new challenges, new risks and new developments (cf Taylor-Gooby, 2005a,b; Beck, 1986; 1992 , 1999 Holzmann et al., 2005; Aspalter et al., 2011) .
As a result, we may expect further developments in social policy in general, and in social security and social insurance in particular. New social risks demand new social security, new social insurance, new forms of being prepared and coping with possibly a much larger number and a much larger magnitude of natural and man-made disasters than we could have only imagined one or two decades ago.
The key problem of major natural and man-made disasters is that to a certain point that is the possibility of private insurance to cope with major disaster. Insurers, then, re-insure themselves to increase the risk-pooling to a global level. But, what happens if an individual, a community, a local/provincial or central government is not able to cope financially with disaster by its own, and on time?
Many risks are not insured or underinsured, or insurance policies exclude certain type of hazards, such as typically large natural disaster, beyond a certain scale. It is thought to be God's will, and beyond the control of human, to cope with certain disaster beyond a certain scale. This is so, because simply it is to expensive for an average insured person to pay for this tremendous costs alone, or he or she is simply not willing to afford high enough premiums. Also, insurance companies may seek to stick with the bread and butter businesses, and avoid dealing with larger risks (if no further incentives and legal support/framework is provided by governments).
The main difference between private insurance and social insurance is the legal mandate, i.e. mandatory coverage, of social insurance programs. Due to full, or utmost, coverage of individuals, social insurance can provide better benefits for certain types of greater risks, as it involves large-scale risk-pooling and redistribution. These risks, up to now, covered old-age poverty, income-maintenance during old age, death of breadwinner or spouse, accident, invalidity, disease and injury, unemployment, as well as long-term care needs.
Climate change and the onset of the new risk society, a global risk society (Beck, 1999) , are creating new realities that are yet to be dealt with by social security solutions. The process of modernization led to increased man-made risks and introduced new man-made risks (e.g. nuclear disasters, chemical plant explosions, global terrorist attacks, etc.) and heightened the risk of natural disasters (e.g. typhoons, floods, droughts, etc.) (Beck, 1986 (Beck, , 1992 .
There is ample room for social security to step in and provide a vital role for large-scale and high impact disasters, that have not yet been covered at all or beyond a certain scale.
This brief paper does not aim at laying out a particular recipe, for a particular solution or policy or policy package. It simply starts to put down first principles and ideas for establishing further research and cooperation between different researchers, research institutions, national and international government institutions, as well as major private insurance and re-insurance companies.
Some first principles, however, may already be drawn for any possible pursuit of these new opportunities to yet again enlarge the variety and scope of social security programs in the not too distant, and hopefully, very near future. These principles for first action on international and domestic systems of social security against major man-made and natural disasters may e.g. include:
(1) the coverage of new risks and old risks above usual cut-off lines (full extent and all aspects of catastrophes shall be covered), (2) universal coverage of people, based on mandatory social insurance (a legal mandate), (3) different risks are covered by different groups of risk-pooling (i.e. different countries get social insurance and re-insurance for different natural and man-made disasters), (4) different risks may also be covered by different techniques in social security provision, that is, just to name a couple of examples, e.g. mandatory social insurance with re-insurance on international scale, provident fund system (personal savings accounts), or provident fund system coupled with social insurance elements (cf e.g. the death insurance within the Central Provident Fund system in Singapore); based on the criteria of e.g. effectiveness, efficiency, and (economic, technical, administrative and political) implementability, (5) different target groups for different risks (i.e. individuals, families, communities, local governments, as well as provincial and national governments), (6) risk pooling should occur internationally (e.g. at least a dozen countries to start with), one preferred solution for this could be (should be) re-insurance, either between government social security provisions or based on a cooperation between national government social security agencies/ministries and large international re-insurance groups, (7) provident fund systems and social insurance and re-insurance systems have the advantage of providing funds in time, no extra communication and negotiations are necessary, no extra transaction costs and transaction time are required, because contracts have been pre-negotiated, funds pre-accumulated, delivery channels pre-determined and set-up in advance (this is a major advantage compared to usual case-by-case funding for major disasters by international government agencies, e.g. World Bank, IMF, ADB, etc.), (8) "maximum liquidity of funds" and "on time delivery of funds" directly to the insured persons/communities/government institutions, which is key for success in disaster and emergency relief, as well as rebuild and re-development missions, (9) and the last, and perhaps the most interesting principle here (in terms of policy outcomes) is that insurance premiums may (and should) reflect danger, preparedness and pre-emptive preventative action of the insured persons, families, communities and government institutions, and hence, reverse negative incentives (e.g. let others pay for one's own non-action) to positive incentives, due to self-interest in prevention and lowering of risks for exchange of lower premiums, e.g. supporting settlement on higher grounds, not near the sea.
